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Abstract: This study presents empirical evidence for the ongoing discussion about the link between
Lean Management (LM) and industry 4.0 (I4.0) by exploring a non-technical perspective on how
manufacturers can capitalize on their technological investments. The paper, therefore, studies the link
between LM and I4.0 from a learning organization (LO) perspective by examining the implementation,
commissioning, and utilization of a real-time operational data gathering system at a Danish building
material manufacturer. This six months in-depth case study finds that for the manufacturer to utilize
real-time operational data from a LO perspective, several barriers must be addressed: problem solving
that is not initiated by operators, operators who do not have second-order problem-solving abilities,
operators who perceive the new real-time data technology as coercive, poor learning environments
and processes, and a lack of leadership that supports learning. This study can help practitioners
understand the importance of balance, the prevalent technocentric focus when implementing new
I4.0 technologies with a LO focus. Furthermore, the study provides practitioners with a list of specific
barriers from a LO perspective to be mindful of when aiming to combine LM and I4.0 to improve
production performance.
Keywords: lean management; Industry 4.0; learning organization; enabling formalization; real-time
data; OEE
1. Introduction
I4.0 is presented as a promising set of integrated digital technologies to improve production
performance significantly and bring manufacturing into the digital age [1]. A core capability of these
I4.0 technologies, when combined, is to institute a level of intelligence to production lines by monitoring
and eventually controlling physical machines [1–3]. By adopting I4.0 technologies, the manufactures
can develop their production setup to potentially become both more effective and flexible in producing
highly customized products on a large scale while still staying competitive regarding high productivity
and continuously lowering costs per produced unit [4].
Therefore, manufacturers have invested many resources into acquiring these new I4.0 technologies
to develop their productions system to be more flexible and productive [5]. However, when investing
heavily in I4.0 technologies, the capital investment gets tied to the production machinery, and the
depreciation cost of these investments is often quite irreversible and possesses low variability. Therefore,
such investment poses financial risk if the technology is not successfully utilized [6]. To ensure full
capitalization of manufactures’ I4.0 technology investments, the literature suggests implementation in
conjunction with process excellence methodologies like Lean Management (LM) [7–9].
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However, most extant literature exploring how I4.0 and LM can elevate production performance
focuses on how to enhance the technical tools and methods of LM [7]. Only focusing on the technical
side of linking I4.0 and LM imposes a significant risk that the implementation of I4.0 technologies
will become stranded in a fledgling state. Many I4.0 implementations will, as such, not be able to
fulfill the very ambitious and novel performance standards reported in discussions of I4.0, just as it
has happened with many LM efforts [10–12]. This amounts to a call for a strengthened focus on the
non-technical aspects like learning organization (LO) practices and behaviors when manufacturers
adopt I4.0 technologies in conjunction with LM for improving production performance [7,13,14].
Conceptually, LM can, from the extant literature, be understood from both a technical perspective
and a non-technical perspective. The technical LM perspective is related to technologies and tools
like pull-systems, Kanban, and value stream mapping [7]. The non-technical perspective is related
to human and cognitive elements like learning, collaboration, and leadership [15]. Analogously,
we can understand I4.0 from both a technical and non-technical perspective. For I4.0, the technological
perspective is the most prevalent in the extant literature and is related to technologies like real-time data,
Internet-of-things, and autonomous robots [1,13]. However, non-technological perspectives of I4.0 are
also on the rise and are related to learning, people development, and managerial aspects [13]. They are
also similar to the non-technological aspects of LM. From an explanatory point of view, this study
perceives LO practices and behaviors as underlying and overlapping factors in linking and mediating
I4.0 and LM, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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The research area exploring the intersection between I4.0 and LM from an LO perspective
is scarce beyond the existing explanatory literature [7]. Tortorella et al. [13] have, for example,
empirically investigated the association betwee O and the adoption of I4.0, and Tortorella and
Fogliatto [15] have done the same between LO and LM, but only quantitively. The aim of this paper is,
therefore, first to follow-up on Buer et al.’s [7] call for additional empirical research on how to link I4.0
and LM. Subsequently, it is to follow-up on recent survey-based research to examine more profoundly
and to validate the positive effects that come f om focusing on LO whe adopti g I4.0 in conjunction
with LM [13,15].
A logical first step for many manufacturers, when embarking on a transformation towards the
digitalization of their production system, is to acquire I4.0 technologies that provide real-time data to
help monitor a d improve the per ormance of m chines and production lines [16]. This paper examines,
as an in-depth field study, the implementation, commissioning, and utilization of a real-time operational
data capturing system, based on OEE (Overall Equipment Effectiveness) data, at a LM-intensive
Danish manufacture. In the wake of implementing the real-time operational data capturing system,
the manufacturer had, after six months, experienced no significant increase in production performance.
The first author observed that the manufacturer had not advanced their existing LM work routines
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after implementation. They continued to practice reactive management-initiated problem solving of
production issues, weekly, based on historical operational data.
The scientific issue behind this real-life problem is the underlying non-technocentric variables
of why the manufacture was not able to enable its organization to both explore and exploit real-time
operational data systems. A central element with this scientific issue is related to real-time data
in a manufacturing context. The commission of real-time data comes with new opportunities but
also challenges for manufactures. Real-time data has the potential to both significantly reduce the
time spent identifying and correcting operational issues like unplanned machine stops and, through
predictive maintenance, prevent operational issues happening in the first place [1]. The significant
challenges are non-technical and associated with the multifaceted change process of shifting leaders
and employees from working reactively to proactively. In a manufacturing context, this challenge is
related to adding new learning routines and work practices on the shop floor. This study, therefore,
proposes the following research question: What are the barriers for operators to utilize real-time
operational data in improving production performance in conjunction with lean management, from a
learning organization perspective?
To answer the research question, the paper will first review the relevant literature linking I4.0
and LM with concepts and practices related to LO. The methods section uses an applied case study
research approach, based on a variety of in-depth qualitative data, like interviews, observations,
and archival data gathered from different sources at the case company. Subsequently, we triangulate
and analyze this data and outline a set of barriers related to LO for utilizing real-time operational data
to improve production performance. We use these findings in the discussion and conclusion section
to elaborate on how to link LM and I4.0 from a LO perspective, by outlining the elements that can
prevent manufactures from utilizing real-time operational data in conjunction with LM to improve
production performance.
1.1. Literature Review
1.1.1. Linking LM and I4.0 Using a Learning Organization Perspective
The literature explains LM implementations most unsuccessfully, with an imbalanced technical
focus on applying LM tools to improve processes, over the LO aspects of LM [12,14,17–19]. In this regard,
all organizations need to learn how to continuously improve processes and develop how they adopt
and utilize new technology daily, to achieve the organization’s strategic objectives while leaders and
employees are simultaneously developed [20,21].
We, therefore, base this study on Edmondson and Moingeon’s [22] (p.28) definition of LO practices
as the process by which an organization’s members actively use data to guide behavior in such a way
as to promote the ongoing adaptation of the organization. The presence of real-time data will not
necessarily lead to better performance if the organization is not able to transform the data into valuable
actions or adjust existing process standards and daily work routines to utilize the new technology.
Likewise, developing new digital versions of LM tools will not make a significant impact if not utilized
as a part of learning processes within a LO.
We found positive associations between LM and LO among several authors in the operation
management literature. These studies can be divided into studies highlighting learning systems and
learning environments as associating concepts between LM and LO, e.g., [23–25]. Other authors focus
more specifically on problem-solving practices as associating concepts, e.g., [26,27].
To advance this study’s objective of empirically exploring how to link LM and I4.0 from an LO
perspective, as opposed to the prevalent focus on technical aspects found in extant literature [7,28],
we consolidated a comparison between the technical domain of both LM and I4.0 and how they are
linked associated through the LO domain in Table 1.
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Table 1. Comparison between LM’s and I4.0’s technical and LO domain.
LM Technical Domain LO Domain I4.0 Technical Domain References
Perspective Technocentric (Analogue) Sociocentric Technocentric(Digital)
[7,16,19,20,29–34]
Type of resource Tangible Intangible Tangible




zero defects, just in time









































coach and develop others,
create vision and align goals



















1.1.2. Second-Order Problem Solving
A critical LO capability for any organization applying LM and aiming to utilize I4.0 is
the organization’s capability to improve performance by adopting scientific problem-solving
practices [21,33,35,36]. Essential to scientific problem-solving practices is Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA),
a generic learning model for defining a problem, identifying the underlying causes, developing and
testing countermeasures, and instituting new standards and work routines [37,38]. In many cases,
problem solving is understood only as a technical process improvement practice, without surfacing the
underlying LO aspects [14,27]. The practice of instructing operators, from a technical point of view,
on how to follow a set of predefined steps in problem solving and analytical tools, but neglecting
the learning and cognitive aspects, has led to many failed attempts at LM and building LO able to
effectively improve performance [38–40].
In both theory and practice, scientific problem-solving practices are closely related to LO
practices [26,27,31]. They share the underlying learning and cognitive process of defining deviation
from the desired state, identifying the root-causes of the current deviation, and subsequently
implementing a set of potential countermeasures to close the deviation and reach the desired state [21,41].
An organization’s ability to perform second-order problem solving daily is central to changing or
adjusting its day-to-day work routines to respond to changes in the production processes, which
eventually leads to improved performance [22,36,42].
The consequences of ignoring the LO side of problem-solving practices often lead to a
problem-solving behavior pattern, characterized as overcoming the immediate obstacle, assuming what
the problem is, short term-fixes, and ignoring the underlying root causes. Tucker et al. [36] observed
this kind of problem-solving behavior pattern among hospital staff, and Worley and Doolen [42] had
similar experiences from observing a lean transformation. From an LO perspective, we can define the
latter form of problem-solving behavior as first-order problem solving instead of second-order problem
solving [36,43]. Second-order problem solving is a cognitive approach that focuses on identifying
underlying root-causes. Identification of root causes happens through investigating current work
routines and practicing in-depth questioning to identify the underlying root-causes preventing an
organization from obtaining a specific goal [36,38,41,43].
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A potential of adopting I4.0 technology is that it can display operation performance data in
real-time and automatically generate performance analyses [1]. Nevertheless, like any analog-generated
data, automatically generated analyses based on real-time data still requires an underlying second-order
problem-solving process. I4.0 technologies can help operators with automated signals and alerts when
deviations occur. However, the operators still need, for example, to apply second-order problem
solving to define the performance gap that needs to be closed, as well as identifying the underlying root
causes and specific countermeasures to close the gap. The latter also requires a structured approach to
experimentation. Real-time data, utilized in conjunction with second-order problem-solving practices,
has the potential to considerably reduce the time it takes from when a problem is perceived to when
it is solved [44]. Firstly, real-time data can immediately indicate when there is a deviation from the
desired state. Then, the digitally captured data can assist the problem solver in both defining the
magnitude of the gap and provide data for root cause analysis. Lastly, real-time data can provide
instant feedback when experimenting with potential countermeasures.
1.1.3. Enabling Formalization
Manufacturers cannot expect operators to automatically embrace new daily work routines of
engaging in second-order problem-solving efforts and utilizing the presence of real-time data to
remove root-causes. According to Adler and Borys [29], it requires an enabling formalization of work
routines, e.g., how to handle deviations and how to utilize real-time data. Manufacturers need to
ensure that operators perceive new digital technologies as something that enables them to improve
their processes in their daily work. There exist two types of formalization: coercive and enabling [29].
If the formalization of work routines is coercive, operators will perceive the purpose of new digital
technologies as a way for management to ensure compliance of rules and procedures by controlling
their work. The underlying logic behind the coercive formalization is that experts and leaders can
design optimal work standards for operators to follow. However, the consequences of coercive
formalization are that that operator separates themselves from their workplace and becomes alienated
instead of becoming committed to daily improvements and problem solving [29,45].
Conversely, when the formalization of new work routines is enabling, they are designed to support
operators in performing their daily tasks and assists them when deviations from regular operation
occur. Enabling formalization of work routines embodies LO practices and dialogue between the
operators, specialists, and management, which celebrates problems as an opportunity to learn and to
improve performance together [21,46]. When formalization is enabling, there also exists a high degree
of mutual trust between different layers of hierarchy, where the operators do not fear reprimands in
case of mistakes.
1.1.4. Supportive Learning Environments and Learning Processes
A linking characteristic between enabling formalization and LO is the presence of a supportive
learning environment consisting of supporting leaders, contextual training, and adequate time to
reflect and experiment [20,29,31,32]. According to Garvin et al. [31], a supportive learning environment
constitutes an environment where operators feel safe disagreeing with others. They can, for example,
freely ask naive questions, own up to mistakes, and present minority viewpoints, along with having the
time to reflect, explore new ideas, conduct experiments, and share knowledge. This understanding is
supported by Marsick and Watkins [32], who also mention that, in a supportive learning environment,
learning is an integrated part of the operator’s daily work. When learning is an integrated part of
daily work routines, it becomes natural for operators to develop and improve processes together with
co-workers, including the ability to express their views and the capacity to listen to and inquire about
the views of others [45].
A supportive learning environment also accompanies internal and global transparency by
consisting of both high- and low-technology systems to capture and share learning across departments,
while helping operators to see how their work is affecting the rest of the organization [29,32].
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1.1.5. Leadership That Supports Learning
A supportive learning environment with formalized learning processes is strongly influenced by
the behaviors of its leaders [19,31,32]. A supportive leader acts on a basic underlying assumption that
she is not the one who adds value to the produced products. It is the operators on the shop floor who
create the value. The type of leadership behavior required to enable operators to increase the value
created for the manufacturer’s customers is described in both the existing LO literature [31,32] and the
LM literature [19,20,23,38].
One of the central principles for a leader when growing a LO with strong second-order problem-solving
abilities is to foster a learning environment with a focus on both striving towards perfection and not blaming
operators when failures occur. A leader must embrace failure as an opportunity for improvement and
learning by enabling, developing, and empowering operators in second-order problem solving to identify
and eradicate root-causes [20,31,32,43]. A fundamental practice of leaders in a LO is to develop their
operators using the principle of ‘going to Gemba’. ‘Going to Gemba’ means that the leaders go to the place
where the organization creates its value, e.g., the shop floor, to understand the current situation and, through
coaching and mentoring, supports and develops operators in their problem-solving efforts towards the
desired state of operation [19,20,23,43].
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. The Case Company
The case company is a production subsidiary of a global family-owned manufacturer of building
material founded in the 1940s. Today, the parent company has more than 11,000 employees globally,
with its headquarters in Denmark. The case company was the first production subsidiary out of 27
production sites located in 10 different countries under the parent company. Located in the western
part of Denmark, the case company employs 450 blue and white collared members of staff. The case
company is furthermore characterized as an LM-intensive manufacturer and has successfully applied
LM in combination with automation for over two decades.
For the case company to cope with expected growth scenarios without just investing in additional
production lines, a digital transformation is one of its top strategic priorities. The first step of the case
company’s digitalization strategy regarding production is to implement new I4.0 technologies that can
support a transformation from reactive machine maintenance, reactive repair, and problem-solving
practices to preventive maintenance and a proactive repair and problem-solving approach. The case
company expects that implementing new I4.0 technologies will allow operators and leaders to
monitor the overall status of the operation through real-time indicators of operating conditions and
production indicators that can enable preventive maintenance, proactive repair, and problem solving.
After successful technology implementation, the case company expects to have algorithms using
historical data to detect indicators of potential unplanned stops and deviations from normal operation.
The intention is to incorporate them into effective problem solving and decision-making to improve
production performance in real-time [1].
The first technology implemented in this digital transformation process is a real-time operational
data gathering system, in one of the case company’s departments. This technology implementation is
the primary research object in this case study.
2.2. Research Approach
Understanding the barriers to implementing and utilizing a real-time operational data gathering
system from an in-depth, non-technical perspective at the case company calls for a qualitative and
explorative research method to collect and analyze data. A qualitative and explorative research
method aided the research aims of clarifying the exact nature of the problem associated with barriers
to utilizing real-time operational data in a manufacturing context. Since our research through theory
refinement/elaboration aimed to contribute to the body of knowledge by developing an in-depth
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understanding of the social phenomenon of advancing LM in conjunction with I4.0 technology,
we applied a case study method [47–49].
A case study approach is a recognized research method for observing and describing a complex
social phenomenon within the field of operations management. A case study is also useful for
conducting empirical research and theory refinement/elaboration when performing a study within
the organizational context where the phenomenon occurs [47,48]. Especially when studying LM,
several academics have based their research strategy on a case study approach, e.g., [11,42,50].
2.3. Data Sources
2.3.1. Sampling
To study the phenomenon of adopting a new real-time operational data gathering system at
the case company and thereby increase our understanding of barriers to utilization, we wanted to
explore the different perceptions among the identified informants in Table 1. Firstly, we selected key,
knowledgeable informants based on their involvement in both the implementation and the following
utilization of the real-time operational data gathering system. We have outlined the different identified
informants and their organizational roles in Table 2.
Table 2. Case study sources (first sampling).
Informants Role in Project Implementation Data Collection
Operator 1 Is operating the production linewhere the system is implemented
Semi-structured interviews
Observation




First-line manager for the




Access to archival data
Factory manager Approved the project and funding Semi-structured interviewsAccess to archival data
Project Engineer 1 Project manager for localimplementation
Semi-structured interviews
Access to archival data
Project Engineer 2




Access to archival data
Maintenance engineer
Responsible for the overall
maintenance of the production
where the system is implemented
Semi-structured interviews
Technology supplier Responsible for delivering thetechnical solution and training Semi-structured interviews
As our fieldwork progressed, and as we, in an iterative process, moved between the field,
the literature, and the development of our analysis, it became apparent that we needed to expand our
unit of analysis. Fully understanding the barriers to utilizing new real-time operational data called for
a broader organizational view and a more in-depth study of the case company’s learning environment,
problem-solving capabilities, and leadership practices. We, therefore, decided to expand our sample
and divide them into four groups of informants, representing the broader organizational context within
the case company. In Table 3, we outline the four groups.
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Table 3. Case study sources (second sampling).
Informants Role Data Collection
Line management 1 general manager, 2 factory managers& 4 department managers
Semi-structured interviews
Observations
Access to archival data
Focus group interviews
Internal lean resources 1 lean manager & 3 local leanrepresentatives
Semi-structured interviews
Observations
Access to archival data
Support functions
1 HR manager, 1 Finance director, 2
controllers, 1 QHSE manager, 1
Maintenance manager, 1 logistic
manager &1 IT responsible
Semi-structured interviews
Focus group interview
Access to archival data




We considered line management as a central group of informants since they, firstly, provided us
with knowledge of the intentions and assumptions behind the decisions made about adopting lean
management and new technology. Secondly, they provided us with knowledge of what strategies and
approaches they, as managers, applied to develop their organization’s lean management capabilities in
general and to utilize new real-time OEE data. Thirdly, they were the primary means of observing
existing leadership practices.
Internal lean resources provided in-depth knowledge of how the case company practices
lean management. They also provided knowledge on what lean management methods and practices are
currently adopted and how they train leaders and operators to apply lean to their daily work routines.
We chose the support functions to find out how the case company’s production system and value
chain was functioning. Furthermore, they also provided knowledge of organizational barriers and
enablers for utilizing lean management in conjunction with real-time OEE data, due to their different
professional backgrounds and high-level of competences within the areas of IT, HR, Logistic, QHSE,
Maintenance, and Finance.
The operators provided us with knowledge of how they apply lean management methods and
practices on the shop floor. They also provided us with insight to enablers and barriers to adopting
the new real-time OEE data gathering systems, from their perspective. Furthermore, they could
reveal potential gaps between the leaders’ espoused theory and the theory-in-use regarding their lean
leadership practices.
By collecting data from different sources and applying different methods of data collection,
we were able to capture different non-technological dimensions of why the manufacturer was not able
to utilize real-time data systems. Furthermore, the applied data triangulation also enabled us to ensure
cross-validation of the data, consistency of the findings, and overall trustworthiness.
2.3.2. Interviews
The purpose of the applied semi-structured interviews during the first interview round was to
explore how the different informants perceived and experienced the implementation, commission,
and utilization of the new real-time operational data gathering system. The interview questions
were therefor composed to accommodate an open and explorative approach to gaining knowledge of
the phenomenon in question from a LO perspective. Based on the knowledge gained from the first
interview round, a set of themes rooted in LM and LO literature emerged. We, therefore, compiled a
new set of interview questions based on existing LM and LO literature to get a deeper understanding of
these factors at the case company. In Table 4, we have listed the questions compiled and the underlying
literature references that prompted their inclusion.
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Table 4. Interview guide.
First Sampling Round Second Sampling Round Second Sampling Round References
What is your role regarding the implementations and
utilization of the new real-time OEE gathering system?
How do you see the purpose behind implementing the
new real-time OEE gathering system?
What activities were you involved in?
What did you expect from the new real-time OEE
gathering system before implementation?
What has happened after the implementation of the new
real-time OEE gathering system?
What have you learned from implementing the new
real-time OEE gathering system?
What obstacles have you experienced in using the new
real-time OEE gathering system to improve performance?
(Technical, managerial, organizational and competence)
What would it take to utilize the real-time OEE gathering
system for improving performance thoroughly?
How is lean management practiced at the factory?
How is performance improved at the factory?
What do you see as the biggest obstacle in
improving performance?
How are operational problems being solved at
the factory?
How is learning practiced at the factory?
How do you leverage digital technologies to
improve performance?
What do you see as the biggest obstacles for
implementing and leveraging digital
technologies to improve performance?
How are operators developed to improve
performance?
How are operators developed to utilize new
technology to improve performance?
How do you develop, execute, and follow up on
your digital strategy?
[14,17,19,20,29,31,33,36,38,51]
We conducted all interviews as free-flowing dialogues. During the interviews, the investigator
made sure that the questions in the interview guide were covered; however, they were not necessarily
covered in a particular order. The informants were also encouraged to discuss their approach to
LM and problem solving in general. The semi-structured interviews lasted 45 min each, and we
digitally recorded them together with reflective notes. With two operators, we conducted an additional
follow-up interview.
2.3.3. Focus Group Interviews
To acquire more in-depth knowledge from the operators’ perspective on how the case
company applies lean management to solve operational problems and utilize new technology to
improve performance, we conducted two focus group sessions [52,53]. A focus group interview
was applied to get direct access to how operators at the case company talk and think about
applying LM, problem solving, and how technology can enable process improvements. As opposed
to a semi-structured interview, we were able to get a more authentic and natural response from
the informants. The dialogue among the informants provides observable data to analyze, which would
be less accessible without interaction and discussion between them [53].
For each of the two focus group interviews, four operators were selected based on diversity
in tenure, gender, production unit, and attitude towards lean management and problem solving.
The duration of the focus group interviews was 60 min. We prompted the groups with three
questions: (1) How does it feel working at the case manufacturer? (2) How do you utilize lean
management to improve production performance? (3) How do you utilize new technology to improve
production performance? To ensure that some informants did not dominate the discussions while
others faded into the background, we asked them to pick one or two pictures that illustrated their
view on the question prompted by us. The informants could choose between 100 different pictures.
The informants told their stories behind the chosen pictures, capturing a more nuanced understanding
of their underlying assumptions behind their responses to the questions asked. Furthermore, it also
elevated the dialogue among the informants as shared stories behind the pictures started to unfold.
We also conducted another form of a group interview with the line management and selected
managers from the support functions. At this group interview, we presented the initial findings from
the conducted analysis and subsequently engaged in discussing the content. We did this to obtain the
advice and perspective of key stakeholders to understand the phenomenon studied [54]. In practice, we
prompted the informants with posters showing the initial findings and conclusions from the conducted
analysis. We then asked them to note down their comments on post-its. Subsequently, we facilitated a
group discussion around each of the posters. The group interview had a duration of two hours. We
digitally recorded all the group interviews in combination with reflective notes.
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2.3.4. Observations
To acquire more in-depth knowledge of the theories in use regarding problem solving
and the leaders’ supportive learning behaviors, we conducted several hours of both direct and
participative observations in addition to the data collected from the interviews [49]. For six months,
the first author conducted observations of daily operational status meetings, problem solving
and prioritization meetings, two four-day process improvement workshops, team meetings,
and management meetings. Throughout the study, the first author documented observations in
field notes and research diaries.
2.3.5. Archival Data
Complimenting the study, the following archival data were collected: operational performance
and operational data, project briefs and plans, internal LM guides, and internal company articles
about the application of LM and new digital technology. Besides providing us with useful
background information, we used these secondary data to validate our initial findings and conclusion.
2.4. Analysis and Coding
Collecting data from diverse sources and applying various methods of data collection enabled us
to capture non-technological variables as to why the manufacturer was unable to utilize real-time data.
Furthermore, the applied data triangulation also enabled us to ensure cross-validation of the data,
consistency of the findings, and overall trustworthiness [54].
To code and analyze the collected data, we applied Braun and Clarke’s [55] (p.87) six-steps thematic
analysis in combination with Saldaña’s [56] guide to coding, as depicted in Table 5. In operations
management research, both approaches are commonly used, e.g., [48,57].
Table 5. Phases of the applied thematic analysis method (reprinted [55] (p.3)).
Phase Description of Process
1. Familiarizing yourself with your data: Transcribing data (if necessary), reading, and re-reading thedata, noting down initial ideas.
2. Generating initial codes: Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashionacross the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.
3. Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all datarelevant to each potential theme.
4. Reviewing themes:
Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts
(Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a
thematic ‘map’ of the analysis.
5. Defining and naming themes:
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme and the
overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions
and names for each theme
6. Producing the report:
The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid,
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected
extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question
and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.
3. Results
3.1. The Utilization of Real-Time Operational Data Requires Operator-Initiated Problem Solving
Before implementing the real-time operational data gathering system, OEE data was registered
manually on paper by the operators. These data were then collected by the local lean responsible
weekly and reported to management. According to the local lean responsible, it was rare that the data
were analyzed and used: “I print all the numbers every Monday, but nothing happens, and we have
no time to go down and analyze the numbers”.
There also seemed to be a widespread basic underlying assumption among the operators that
their role is not to engage actively in problem solving but ‘only’ to generate ideas for problem
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solving or improvements, then let maintenance handle them. During a focus group interview with
the operators, one expressed this basic underlying assumption, saying: "It is easy to generate ideas,
but there is nobody to execute them."
The same behavior and basic underlying assumption were also apparent in terms of
machine maintenance. They used manually gathered OEE data to prioritize which production
lines and machines the maintenance department should focus on fixing at a bi-weekly meeting.
However, despite management ambition to conduct preventive maintenance, repairs were mainly
carried out when equipment caused unplanned downtime. One of the operators explained this reactive
approach to maintenance like this: "We do not work much with preventive maintenance. We do not
have the time, and we just call the maintenance department when the machines break down".
It was the presence of this reactive, firefighting behavior to problem solving and maintenance
that the leaders in the case company were seeking to change with the implementation of the real-time
operational data gathering system. However, six months after its implementation, the case company
could ascertain no significant change in behavior or improvement in performance. The operators
confirmed the lack of changed behavior during a focus group interview: "We do not use the data from
the real-time data gathering system since it is not our system, it is maintenance’s, so they can see what
they need to fix." Another indicator supporting the fact that the operators had not altered their daily
work practice to utilize the real-time operational data was when the operational gathering system had
been out of order for over a week. The operators knew that the system had stopped working but did
not escalate the problem. It was a project engineer who discovered and corrected it.
Despite the presence of operational data in real-time, the procedure for utilizing the operational
data was the same as before implementation. The local lean responsible still gathered the OEE data
weekly to submit a report to the management. They also still conducted prioritization meetings
between the production department leader, the local lean responsible, and the maintenance department
on a bi-weekly basis.
3.2. First-Order Problem Solving PrevalentAapproach to Reducing Unplanned Machine Downtime
Before implementing the real-time operational gathering system, applying second-order problem
solving was not a widespread capability among operators. Problem solving based on PDCA was
only conducted occasionally in cases of critical quality issues. In these cases, the quality department
performed the problem solving.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the prevalent problem-solving behavior observed among operators and
maintenance specialists can be characterized as overcoming the immediate obstacle, assuming what
the problem is, short term-fixes, and ignoring the underlying root cause. If the short-term fixes do not
result in resuming regular operation, then the maintenance department will be contacted to re-start
the machine. This observation was supported by a leader who explained: "We are often saying that we
really need to get to the bottom of this and identify the root causes, but we do not."
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It is important that operators begin to start acting on real-time operational data, but more important
still is that they do this by applying daily second-order problem-solving based on PDCA, as depicted
in Figure 2. The operators were familiar with several of the LM problem-solving tools and methods
introduced by the global lean department. However, our observations revealed that the operators
only performed first-order problem solving [36]. Due to the underlying basic assumption among
operators that it is not their responsibility to identify the root causes preventing machines from running
could explain why first-order problem solving is the prevalent practice when handling unplanned
machine stops. "We are only doing firefighting," as one of the operators explained.
As Tucker et al. [36] observed among nurses, there also seemed to be a prevalent heroic attitude
among the maintenance specialists. When machines break down, they often come and "save the day"
by fixing the machine. This behavior fuels a psychological gratification, which maintains the observed
first-order problem-solving behaviors. "We honor the firefighters," one of the leaders reasoned in
an interview.
Shortly after implementing the real-time operational data system, the maintenance department
initiated a set of 11 specific fixes. From observing the implementation of these 11 fixes, we identified two
clear examples of first-order problem solving. Firstly, the 11 fixes were initiated at the same time without
any specification of what gap or deviation in performance they intended to close. The maintenance
department was, therefore, not able to evaluate if the fixes had worked and, eventually, which of
the fixes worked the best. Investigating the effects of the fixes revealed that they had not improved
performance significantly. Secondly, according to the operators, the fixes were not initiated based
on OEE data. The operators explained that the initiated fixes had been on their wish list for a
long time, and now management had approved them due to renewed attention on their production
lines’ performance as a result of the real-time operational data gathering system implementation.
3.3. Real-Time Data System Perceived as Coercive
Our findings identified that the new real-time operational data gathering system implementation
was carried out by experts and specialists from the support functions. Despite their intention,
the specialists had not involved the operators in identifying the best real-time operational data
gathering system and how to implement it. Before implementation, the operators only participated in
an introduction to the system delivered by the technology supplier. After the implementation, the
operators only received training in the technical use of the system. Once the functionality of the system
was up and running, the experts and specialists from the support functions were off to the next project,
and the employees were left alone to ensure utilization of the new real-time operational data gathering
system to improve performance.
This coercive formalization approach to implementing the new real-time operational data
gathering system adopted by the support functions specialist had several consequences contributing
to unsuccessful implementation [29]. Firstly, it maintained the operators in the existing first-order
problem-solving approach, as depicted in Figure 2, where they were not cooperating with others
in conducting the analysis and making decisions on how to improve or fix the machines they
were operating: “After the implementation, I still gather data once a week and type it in, and the only
change is that I now can get them from the system instead”. Secondly, it strengthened the underlying
assumption that it is only the support functions experts and specialists who can identify and implement
new technology. “Only ideas of implementing new technology from the engineers get implemented”,
one of the operators responded. Thirdly, the operators ended up perceiving that the new real-time
operational data gathering system was imposing constraints on their work by adding new tasks in
terms of interacting with the system. This perception was clouding the intention for the system to
enable operators to reveal opportunities for improvement and problem-solving.
Despite the opposite intention behind implementing the real-time operational data
gathering system, the operators did not perceive that the feedback received from the system was
useful to them in their efforts to improve production performance. Instead, they believed that the
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new real-time operational data gathering system was only put in place to help management and
maintenance get a better understanding of the production lines’ performance: "We do not need the
new system to tell us what is wrong with the machines."
For the operators to utilize the new real-time data gathering system to improve performance,
it is also vital to ensure a practice of problem-solving and continuous improvement across
departmental siloes. However, the expected outcome of the implementation of the system also
failed to appear in this regard. "I expected closer integration between maintenance and production
after the system implementation, but it did not happen," the maintenance supervisor explained. One of
the operators supported the leader: "We still do not work much together across the factory. If we all
helped each other, things would be better ".
3.4. Poor Learning Environment and Learning Processes
At first glance, one would expect the existence of a supportive learning environment at the place
of manufacture, since operators articulate the presence of psychological safety [58]. Operators feel they
can speak up about what is on their mind. We observed several meetings supporting the notation that
employees can speak freely. At one meeting, an operator complained about the planning department
to his leader while the head of planning was present in the room. Our findings did furthermore not
indicate a culture where the operators are reprimanded for failures and therefore try to hide them.
However, a supportive learning environment consists of more than psychological safety. A central
element is allocating time to experiment and reflect on how to improve work routines in conjunction
with new technology [31,59]. Our data analysis revealed that operators felt that there was no time
allocated to engage in improving work routines: "We do not have time to make improvements; after
11 hours on the job, I just want to go home". The operators explained the lack of time available to
develop new work routines as a result of high workload. "We start up a lot but do not finish much.
We want to do everything at the same time," one of the leaders responded.
Another critical element of a supportive learning environment and learning processes is conducting
experiments in a structured way [43]. Despite management’s willingness to experiment with new
technologies, the execution of experiments could also be characterized as first-order problem-solving.
A contributing factor was difficulties in defining a concrete deviation or gap from the desired state,
e.g., it was observed that a perceived solution was often defined as the goal itself instead of a means
to achieving a specific performance improvement goal. When this was the case, it was difficult to
subsequently follow-up and reflect on the learning from an experiment and evaluate the effects [43].
3.5. Leaders Not Demonstrating Support for Learning
Based on the interviews and observations, a gap between leaders’ espoused theory and
theory-in-use emerged [60]. The leaders had the following perception of their leadership behavior.
One stated: “leadership is for me to listen to the employees and identify what needs to be done for
them to do their best and be a success”. “Another leader explained”, “My job is to help and coach the
employees to improve performance and reach our strategic goals”. Furthermore, a third leader replied,
“As a leader, I must be visible and give the employees feedback”. This perception is in sharp contrast
to how the operators experience their leaders. “I feel that the leaders do not listen to us. I would like
them to exhibit more interest in our work”, as one operator explained. Another operator felt that: “It is
often difficult to get hold of my leader. They only come when the KPIs (Key performance indicators)
are in red, and then they expect us to fix it”.
Perceptions of the leader’s current presence and support held the operators also indicate a
behavioral gap related to the principle of ‘going to Gemba’. According to the operators, the leaders are
rarely observed going to the shop floor to understand the current situation and mentoring or coaching
the operators in solving problems or conducting improvements [20].
Even though the leaders’ espoused theories of commitment to developing their employees,
they instead exhibited a prevalent behavioral script of first-order problem solving. As operators,
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they handle their leadership and operational problems with short term fixes [41]. It was, for example,
observed that the leaders handle imminent production challenges by shuffling operators around as
opposed to proactively enabling and empowering them to initiate second-order problem solving and
address the underlying root causes within the operational system. An observed and explaining factor
behind this predominant behavior is the primary focus on short-term and urgent matters. As one of
the leaders reflected: “We always feel that we are behind. I would like to get in front of things and be
proactive instead of just firefighting”.
Another observed behavioral script among the leaders, which prevents the operators from
engaging in second-order problem solving, is the preference of setting the destination as a fixed goal
or the implementation of a solution as opposed to a direction. This behavior reflects habits of giving
the answers to what the operators should do to fix a problem instead of asking questions that fuel
reflection, learning, and development among operators. It was, for example, observed in an operation
status meeting that the highest-ranking leader only asked six open-ended questions but came with
64 orders and evaluating remarks during the meeting.
4. Discussion
The identified themes constitute the groundwork for the conceptual model depicted in Figure 3.
Based on empirical findings and observations from studying the case company’s implementation,
commissioning, and utilization of their new real-time gathering system, we propose the conceptual
model illustrated in Figure 3. The study implies, from a LO perspective, that for operators to utilize
real-time operational data and harvest the benefits of significantly reducing the time spent identifying
and correcting operational issues like unplanned machine stops in order to prevent operational issues
from happening, manufactures need to overcome a set of related barriers.
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4.1. No Utilizing of Real-Time Data to Improve Production Performance if Operators Do Not Initiate
Problem Solving
Our empirical findings indicate that, despite knowledge of LM tools and methods to perform
problem solving and training with the real-time operational data gathering system, the operators did not
adopt new routines and work practices to improve performance proactively. Our findings indicate that
if manufacturers intend to move towards proactive operator-initiated problem solving, the technical
implementation of real-time operational data gathering technology is not enough. Applying a solely
technical focus on implementing new technology will not in itself enable operators to initiate problem
solving and utilize real-time operational data. Manufactures must firstly, together with the operators,
institute new routines and work procedures; thus, it is the operator’s responsibility to initiate problem
solving daily when deviations from planned operations occur. Otherwise, the benefits of having
real-time data available are not achievable.
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4.2. Lack of Second-Order Problem-Solving Abilities Among Operators Prevents Them from Utilizing
Real-Time Data
Our findings support the notion that the lack of second-order problem solving abilities
among operators, including a structured approach to learning, experimentation, and reflections,
is one of the explaining factors preventing the utilization of real-time operational data. Only practicing
first-order problem solving prevents the organization from engaging in the deeper thinking required
to practice second-order problem solving. It also prevents them from adjusting their day-to-day work
routines so that, once formalized in an enabling way, they can utilize real-time operational data [29,42].
I4.0 technologies cannot replace human cognitive processed related to the operators’ reflection and
imagination when identifying root causes behind production problems and countermeasures for
resolutions and improvements [1]. We can, therefore, also conclude that operator-initiated problem
solving entails both developing and empowering the operators to perform daily second-order problem
solving [36].
4.3. A Coercive Perception of Real-Time Data Systems Among Operators Prevents Them from Initiating
Problem Solving Based on Real-Time Data
An explaining factor of why the operators did not utilize the new real-time operational data system
was that they perceived it as coercive and a system serving management and support functions as
opposed to enabling them to, e.g., more effectively handle unplanned production stops and eventually
prevent them [29]. Despite the opposite intention of implementing the real-time operational data
gathering system, the operators do not perceive that the feedback received from the system is useful for
them in their efforts to improve production performance [46]. Instead, they feel that they must perform
additional non-value-adding work procedures to accommodate management and the maintenance
department in getting a better understanding of the production lines’ performance.
4.4. Poor Supportive Learning Environments and Learning Processes Disseminate a Coercive Formalization of
Real-time Operational Data Utilization and Hinder Developing Operators’ Second-Order
Problem-Solving Capabilities
Despite a high level of psychological safety, the operators are not sufficiently engaged and
empowered to find out how to utilize real-time operational data. If the current learning environment
was supportive, the operators would be involved as active participants during the implementation
and commissioning of the real-time operational data system. Management and specialists would
have facilitated the operators in finding the best practices when it came to using the new system and
integrating it into their daily practices [29,31].
Our findings reveal that the presence of a poor supportive learning environment and learning
processes upholds first-order problem-solving behaviors of quickly fixing problems in the case of
unplanned stops. The current learning environment is preventing the operators from being proactive
in eliminating unplanned stops instead of expecting the maintenance department and management
to act. An explaining factor is that there is no allocated time or structured approach to learning,
experimentation, and reflection, in addition to deviations not being embraced as learning opportunities
by leaders and operators.
Furthermore, training in the new system was not contextual. Marsick and Watkins [32] confirm
the importance of contextual training. They point out that it is essential that learning is an integrated
part of the operator’s daily work, which includes the ability to solve problems together with co-workers.
Developing and empowering the operators to perform daily second-order problem solving must,
therefore, be facilitated by the presence of a supportive learning environment and processes [31,32].
Sustainability 2020, 12, 8757 16 of 19
4.5. Lack of Leadership Supporting Learning Disseminates Poor Supportive Learning Environments and
Processes
The leaders’ behaviors are essential in establishing a supportive learning environment and
learning processes, where, for example, the operators are enabled to utilize real-time operational
data to improve production performance [19,31]. Our empirical findings indicate a gap between the
leaders’ espoused theories of how they aspire to enable, develop, and empower the operators and
the theory-in-use [17,39]. The gaps identified from the empirical findings and observations were,
e.g., related to the leaders’ inadequate practice of being present, ‘going to Gemba’, asking questions
instead of telling, and coaching and mentoring practices towards the operators. Similarly, as the
operators must solve specific operational problems by conducting second-order problem solving, the
leaders also must perform second-order problem solving. The difference is that the leaders focus on a
higher-level problem of how to develop a supportive learning environment and learning processes
instead. We observed no sign of committing to the daily development of operators during their
problem-solving and improvement activities [19].
4.6. Initial Example from Explicitly Addressing the Identified Barriers
After being presented with the findings from the analysis, the manufacture decided to
engage with the first author in an action-learning experiment that addresses the identified barriers.
The action-learning experiment consists of two action-learning interventions. In the first action-learning
intervention, two department managers, together with their factory manager, were selected to undergo
intensive training in second-order problem solving [38] and problem-solving coaching [44]. During this
action-learning intervention, the managers solved a concrete problem by coaching each other, supervised
by the first author. Subsequently, in the second action-learning intervention, each department manager
selected two groups of operators to work on a concrete operational problem concerning production
lines where real-time data were available. For four weeks, the department manager would coach and
support the operators in solving the selected problems. Simultaneously, the factory manager would
coach the department managers on their effort to support the operators. Based on initial anecdotes,
operational data and observations, one department improved performance by 10% on one of their
production lines during the second action-learning intervention by conducting second-order problem
solving and utilizing the new real-time operational data systems.
5. Conclusions
Our scientific contribution is firstly to identify specific non-technological barriers that prevent
manufactures from enabling their organization to explore and exploit real-time operational data
from a LO perspective. We attain this by proposing a conceptual model (Figure 3) based on the
theoretical notions of second-order problem solving [36], enabling formalization [29], fostering a
supportive learning environment, and processes [31,32] and leadership that supports learning [19,31].
The cross-fertilizing of these theoretical notions within the conceptual model helps us to understand
what it requires to implement new learning routines and work practices on the manufacturing shop
floor and utilize real-time operational data proactively. Secondly, our finding suggests that effective
implementation and commissioning of Industry 4.0 technologies, like real-time operational data,
requires the existence of an LM environment. However, this does not only mean a technocentric LM
environment where organizational members have been introduced and trained in LM tools and methods,
but an LM environment conjoined with a supportive learning environment and supportive leadership.
Thirdly, the study adds to recent survey-based research by getting behind statistical numbers and
understanding how LM and I4.0 are empirically associated through the non-technical lens of LO in a
manufacturing context.
The practical implications derived from this study suggest that manufacturers cannot rely on a
solely technological focus when implementing I4.0 technologies and linking them with existing or new
LM capabilities. For manufactures to ensure a successful return of investment from acquiring new I4.0
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technologies, they need to balance both technical and non-technical perspectives. New technology
does not automatically bring about desired changes to operators’ behaviors that result in them utilizing
these technologies just by implementing them. Despite the best designs and intentions, manufactures
must also consider how to advance their second-order problem-solving abilities. The study, therefore,
advises manufacturers to develop their leaders’ ability to grow a supportive learning environment and
implement learning practices, ensuring that, as new data generating I4.0 technology gets implemented,
underlying work routines and practices are formalized in an enabling way.
A limitation of this in-depth single case study is its generalizability. This single case study is
limited to the specific context of the utilization of real-time operational data in a manufacturing setting
in Denmark and, therefore, is not able to extrapolate any statistical generalization for other contexts [50].
The analytical generalizability of the study is based on solid theories of why manufacturers are not
able to utilize real-time data and how to link LM and I4.0 from the non-technical perspective of LO.
Therefore, further research should validate the conceptual model from this study statistically across
different manufacturing organizations for different markets and locations. Additionally, future research
should examine how manufacturers can overcome the identified barriers, e.g., examine the effect that
developing leaders’ ability to grow a supportive learning environment and the effect that learning
processes have on formalizing underlying work routines in an enabling way when utilizing new I4.0
technologies in an LM environment.
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